Somogy Varga
Aarhus University, Philosophy and History of Ideas, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Psychiatry, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Psychology, Social and Political Philosophy, Perception, Personal and Moral Autonomy, and 19 moreHuman Dignity, Disaster, Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Psychopathology, Naturalism, Mental Health, Extended Mind, Mental Representation, Consciousness, Cognitive Science, Embodiment, Intentionality, Emotion, Social Cognition, Priming, Emotion Regulation, Genetic Enhancement, and Psychiatryedit
- I am professor of philosophy at Aarhus University. I completed my PhD at Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. I work... moreI am professor of philosophy at Aarhus University. I completed my PhD at Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. I worked at the University of Memphis (2012-2019), the Institute of Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabrück (2009-2012), and the Institute of Social Research at Goethe University Frankfurt (2007-2009).edit
This book reassesses current criticisms of medicine, offers an account of its nature and aim, and suggests solutions to challenges.
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The book offers a comprehensive account of cognitive scaffolding and its significance for understanding mental disorders.
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Here's the introduction.
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This book provides a systematic, multi-perspective analysis of a crucial concept in contemporary philosophical debates, and it contributes to debates on practical identity, personal autonomy, motivational structures, and moral agency. It... more
This book provides a systematic, multi-perspective analysis of a crucial concept in contemporary philosophical debates, and it contributes to debates on practical identity, personal autonomy, motivational structures, and moral agency. It includes contributions by Christoph Bambauer (Ruhr Universität Bochum), Katharina Bauer (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen), Kathi Beier (KU Leuven), Jan Bransen (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen), Oliver Hallich (Universität Duisburg-Essen), Jonathan Jacobs (City University of New York), Michael Kühler (Universiteit Twente), Heidi Maibom (University of Cincinnati), Corinna Mieth (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Arnd Pollmann (Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magedburg), Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois at Chicago), and Somogy Varga (University of Memphis). The book is the outcome of two international workshops on “practical necessity” that were financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and generously supported by the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen.
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The guiding aim of the thirty-fourth annual Spindel Conference on “Exploitation” (University of Memphis, November 2015) was to contribute to a renewed theoretical interest in the concept and to provide a forum where representatives of... more
The guiding aim of the thirty-fourth annual Spindel Conference on “Exploitation” (University of Memphis, November 2015) was to contribute to a renewed theoretical interest in the concept and to provide a forum where representatives of different views could engage in a productive debate. This volume contains papers delivered at that conference, providing up-to-date investigations into the concept of exploitation and its place in current moral landscape by prominent scholars.
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How do people understand the concepts of mental health and disorder? The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of several factors on people's judgments about whether a condition constitutes a mental disorder or a healthy state.... more
How do people understand the concepts of mental health and disorder? The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of several factors on people's judgments about whether a condition constitutes a mental disorder or a healthy state. Specifically, this study examines the impact of the source of the condition, its outcome, individual valuation (i.e., the value the individual attaches to the condition), and group valuation (i.e., the value the relevant group attaches to the condition). While we find that people's health and disorder judgments are driven by perceived dysfunction, we also find that health and disorder judgments are impacted differently by these factors. Health judgements are impacted by outcome and individual valuation, and disorder judgments are impacted by condition source. These results suggest that the folk concept of mental health is positive (i.e., mental health is more than the absence of mental disorder) and normativist (i.e., value judgments play a significant role in determining whether a condition counts as healthy), while the concept of mental disorder aligns with a naturalist perspective, at least to the extent that dysfunction plays an important role in categorizing a condition as a disorder. However, our finding that people's dysfunction judgments are influenced by individual valuation and outcomes poses a strong challenge to naturalist accounts. To provide access to our supplementary data, an appendix has been included.
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Debates about the genuine disease status of controversial diseases rely on intuitions about a range of factors. Adopting tools from experimental philosophy, this paper explores some of the factors that influence judgments about whether... more
Debates about the genuine disease status of controversial diseases rely on intuitions about a range of factors. Adopting tools from experimental philosophy, this paper explores some of the factors that influence judgments about whether low sexual desire should be considered a disease and whether it should be medically treated. Drawing in part on some assumptions underpinning a divide in the literature between viewing low sexual desire as a genuine disease and seeing it as improperly medicalized, we investigate whether health and disease judgments are affected by factors such as an individual's gender, the cause of the low desire, whether the desire is high or low, and both personal and societal valuations of the condition. Our main findings indicate that (a) the cause of a condition influences whether it is judged a disorder, (b) how the individual values the condition influences whether the condition is seen as a proper target of medical intervention, and (c) perceived dysfunction influences judgments regarding health, disorder classification, medicalization, and medical intervention. Our findings help further illuminate the intricate interplay of factors that influence judgments about health and disease in controversial conditions.
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Body checking, characterized by the repeated visual or physical inspection of particular parts of one's own body (e.g. thighs, waist, or upper arms) is one of the most prominent behaviors associated with eating disorders, particularly... more
Body checking, characterized by the repeated visual or physical inspection of particular parts of one's own body (e.g. thighs, waist, or upper arms) is one of the most prominent behaviors associated with eating disorders, particularly Anorexia Nervosa (AN). In this paper, we explore the explanatory potential of the Recalcitrant Fear Model of AN (RFM) in relation to body checking. We argue that RFM, when combined with certain plausible auxiliary hypotheses about the cognitive and epistemic roles of emotions, is able to explain key characteristics of body checking, including how body checking behavior becomes habitual and compulsive.
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Proponents of manipulation arguments against compat- ibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particu- lar action) do not impact... more
Proponents of manipulation arguments against compat-
ibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents
are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the
manipulator intends that an agent perform a particu-
lar action) do not impact judgments about free will and
moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation
arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact
but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by
Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people’s
judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: peo-
ple judged that an agent was less free and responsible
when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least
one but not all agents) than when the manipulation
was universal (impacting every agent). This study exam-
ines people’s judgements about existential and universal
manipulation cases that involve both intentional and
non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation
scope also affects people’s free will and responsibility
judgments in manipulation cases involving both inten-
tional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we
also found that manipulation type influences the effect
that manipulation scope has on people’s free will judg-
ments but not their moral responsibility judgments,
which indicates that people’s free will and responsibil-
ity judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the
prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and
moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.
ibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents
are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the
manipulator intends that an agent perform a particu-
lar action) do not impact judgments about free will and
moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation
arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact
but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by
Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people’s
judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: peo-
ple judged that an agent was less free and responsible
when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least
one but not all agents) than when the manipulation
was universal (impacting every agent). This study exam-
ines people’s judgements about existential and universal
manipulation cases that involve both intentional and
non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation
scope also affects people’s free will and responsibility
judgments in manipulation cases involving both inten-
tional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we
also found that manipulation type influences the effect
that manipulation scope has on people’s free will judg-
ments but not their moral responsibility judgments,
which indicates that people’s free will and responsibil-
ity judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the
prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and
moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.
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Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism... more
Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. Keywords Temporal passage • Belief • Cognitive illusionism • Cognitive error theory 1 Introduction Questions regarding temporal passage have attained a central place in philosophical debates, and recent studies on our temporal phenomenology in the cognitive sciences B Somogy Varga
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Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of... more
Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of behavioural effects across cognitive, affective, and perceptual domains. Additionally, respiratorymodulated brain oscillations have been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover new pathways for understanding the link between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.
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While research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has traditionally focused on cognitive and behavioral deficits, there is increasing interest in exploring possible resources associated with the disorder. In this paper, we... more
While research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has traditionally focused on cognitive and behavioral deficits, there is increasing interest in exploring possible resources associated with the disorder. In this paper, we argue that the attention-patterns associated with ADHD can be understood as expressing an alternative style of inquiry, or "zetetic" style, characterized mainly by a lower barrier for becoming curious and engaging in inquiry, and a weaker disposition to regulate curiosity in response to the cognitive and practical costs associated with inquiry. Exploring this zetetic style from an epistemological perspective, we show that it is often epistemically rational and can be advantageous in important respects. We close by suggesting that the very aspects of the zetetic style that might at times render it disadvantageous from the point of view of individual subjects with ADHD, will often confer epistemic benefits to the social group that the subjects are part of.
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Recent criticisms of medicine converge on fundamental questions about the aim of medicine. The main task of this paper is to propose an account of the aim of medicine. Discussing and rejecting the initially plausible proposal according to... more
Recent criticisms of medicine converge on fundamental questions about the aim of medicine. The main task of this paper is to propose an account of the aim of medicine. Discussing and rejecting the initially plausible proposal according to which medicine is pathocentric, the paper presents and defends the Autonomy Thesis, which holds that medicine is not pathocentric, but sanocentric, aiming to promote health with the final aim to enhance autonomy. The paper closes by considering the objection that the Autonomy Thesis is overly permissive and allows many highly controversial procedures as legitimate parts of medicine.
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This paper aims to clarify the nature of understanding in medicine. The first part describes in more detail what it means to understand something and links a type of understanding (i.e., objectual understanding) to explanations. The... more
This paper aims to clarify the nature of understanding in medicine. The first part describes in more detail what it means to understand something and links a type of understanding (i.e., objectual understanding) to explanations. The second part proceeds to investigate what objectual understanding of a disease (i.e., biomedical understanding) requires by considering the case of scurvy from the history of medicine. The main hypothesis is that grasping a mechanistic explanation of a condition is necessary for a biomedical understanding of that condition. The third part of the paper argues that biomedical understanding is necessary, but not sufficient for understanding in a clinical context (i.e., clinical understanding). The hypothesis is that clinical understanding combines biomedical understanding of a disease or pathological condition with understanding illness, which involves some degree of personal understanding of the patient. It is argued that, in many cases, clinical understanding necessitates adopting a particular second-personal stance and using cognitive resources in addition to those involved in biomedical understanding.
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The DSM-5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the... more
The DSM-5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the emphasis from false belief to recalcitrant fear can supplement a number of different non-doxastic models of AN.
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Medicine is increasingly subject to various forms of criticism. This paper focuses on dominant forms of criticism and offers a better account of their normative character. It is argued that together, these forms of criticism are... more
Medicine is increasingly subject to various forms of criticism. This paper focuses on dominant forms of criticism and offers a better account of their normative character. It is argued that together, these forms of criticism are comprehensive, raising questions about both medical science and medical practice. Furthermore, it is shown that these forms of criticism mainly rely on standards of evaluation that are assumed to be internal to medicine and converge on a broader question about the aim of medicine. Further work making medicine's internal norms explicit and determining the aim of medicine would not only help to clarify to what extent the criticism is justified, but also assist an informed deliberation about the future of medicine. To illustrate some of the general difficulties associated with such a task, the paper concludes by critically engaging Edmund Pellegrino's account of the aim of medicine as well as the Hastings Center's consensus report.
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Respiratory rhythms sustain biological life, governing the homeostatic exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. Until recently, however, the influence of breathing on the brain has largely been overlooked. Yet new evidence demonstrates that... more
Respiratory rhythms sustain biological life, governing the homeostatic exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. Until recently, however, the influence of breathing on the brain has largely been overlooked. Yet new evidence demonstrates that the act of breathing exerts a substantive, rhythmic influence on perception, emotion, and cognition, largely through the direct modulation of neural oscillations. Here, we synthesize these findings to motivate a new predictive coding model of respiratory brain coupling, in which breathing rhythmically modulates both local and global neural gain, to optimize cognitive and affective processing. Our model further explains how respiratory rhythms interact with the topology of the functional connectome, and we highlight key implications for the computational psychiatry of disordered respiratory and interoceptive inference.
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It is common to distinguish between "holist" and "reductionist" views of brain function, where the former envisions the brain as functioning as an indivisible unit and the latter as a collection of distinct units that serve different... more
It is common to distinguish between "holist" and "reductionist" views of brain function, where the former envisions the brain as functioning as an indivisible unit and the latter as a collection of distinct units that serve different functions. Opposing reductionism, a number of researchers have pointed out that cortical network architecture does not respect functional boundaries, and the neuroanatomist V. Braitenberg proposed to understand the cerebral cortex as a "great mixing machine" of neuronal activity from sensory inputs, motor commands, and intrinsically generated processes. In this paper, we offer a contextualization of Braitenberg's point, and we review evidence for the interactions of neuronal activity from multiple sensory inputs and intrinsic neuronal processes in the cerebral cortex. We focus on new insights from studies on audiovisual interactions and on the influence of respiration on brain functions, which do not seem to align well with "reductionist" views of areal functional boundaries. Instead, they indicate that functional boundaries are fuzzy and context dependent. In addition, we discuss the relevance of the influence of sensory, proprioceptive, and interoceptive signals on cortical activity for understanding brain-body interactions, highlight some of the consequences of these new insights for debates on embodied cognition, and offer some suggestions for future studies. Keywords Multisensory integration • Respiration-locked oscillations • Brain-breath coupling • Embodied cognition "Transcortical connections have been shown to exist even in the primary sensory regions of the cortex, indicating that sensory input is immediately mixed upon its arrival in the cortex with information about the state of the rest of the cortex." (V. Braitenberg 1974, [10]) This article is part of the special issue on Embodied Brain in Pflügers Archiv-European Journal of Physiology.
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The paper engages Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST). In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet-that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level... more
The paper engages Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST). In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet-that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology-it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such parthood choices are based on non-naturalistic considerations. We demonstrate that even when parthood choices are based on the best way to preserve BST, there are counterintuitive results which bring the central tenet of BST into question.
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Background: There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001,... more
Background: There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized.
Method: We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma.
Conclusion: We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.
Method: We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma.
Conclusion: We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.
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It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and... more
It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and philosophical literature is that the seat of irrationality is located in the obsessive thoughts characteristic of OCD. Building on a puzzle about insight into OCD, we challenge this pervasive assumption, and argue instead that the irrationality of OCD is located in the emotions that are characteristic of OCD, such as anxiety or fear. In particular, we propose to understand the irrationality of OCD as a matter of harboring recalcitrant emotions. We argue that this account not only solves the puzzle about insight, but also makes better sense of how OCD sufferers experience and describe their condition and helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of compulsive behavior.
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Over the past six years, a rapidly growing number of studies have shown that respiration exerts a significant influence on sensory, affective, and cognitive processes. At the same time, an increasing amount of experimental evidence... more
Over the past six years, a rapidly growing number of studies have shown that
respiration exerts a significant influence on sensory, affective, and cognitive processes.
At the same time, an increasing amount of experimental evidence indicates that this influence occurs via modulation of neural oscillations and their synchronization between brain areas. In this article, we review the relevant findings and discuss whether and they might inform our understanding of a variety of disorders that have been associated with abnormal patterns of respiration. We review literature on the role of respiration in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), anxiety (panic attacks), and autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and we conclude that the new insights
into respiratory modulation of neuronal activity may help understand the relationship between respiratory abnormalities and cognitive and affective deficits.
respiration exerts a significant influence on sensory, affective, and cognitive processes.
At the same time, an increasing amount of experimental evidence indicates that this influence occurs via modulation of neural oscillations and their synchronization between brain areas. In this article, we review the relevant findings and discuss whether and they might inform our understanding of a variety of disorders that have been associated with abnormal patterns of respiration. We review literature on the role of respiration in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), anxiety (panic attacks), and autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and we conclude that the new insights
into respiratory modulation of neuronal activity may help understand the relationship between respiratory abnormalities and cognitive and affective deficits.
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This paper aims to contribute to debates about the nature of philosophical inquiry and its relation to science. The starting point is the Discontinuity View (DV), which holds that philosophy is discontinuous with science. Upon critically... more
This paper aims to contribute to debates about the nature of philosophical inquiry and its relation to science. The starting point is the Discontinuity View (DV), which holds that philosophy is discontinuous with science. Upon critically engaging two lines of argument in favor of DV, the paper presents and defends the Continuity View (CV), according to which philosophy and science are continuous forms of inquiry. The critical engagement sheds light on continuities between philosophical and scientific inquiry while underlining special normative competences of philosophical work. The final part of the paper uses these insights to offer a brief outline of a normative approach to philosophy of science.
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Although highly relevant, philosophical theory and philosophical competences are rarely integrated in empirical public health research. We suggest a variant of applied philosophy that is valuable for the development and improvement of... more
Although highly relevant, philosophical theory and philosophical competences are rarely integrated in empirical public health research. We suggest a variant of applied philosophy that is valuable for the development and improvement of public health research. We call it practice-guided public health philosophy because: (i) research questions derive from public health challenges, i.e. real-life concerns that relate to the prevention of disease or the promotion of health and well-being, (ii) the ultimate test of success lies within an empirical framework aiming to improve public health practices and (iii) philosophers collaborate very closely with different kinds of empirical researchers in the different stages of the research process. Using examples from current public health projects at the National Institute of Public Health at the University of Southern Denmark, we outline three paradigmatic cases of practice-guided public health philosophy: (i) by using philosophy as an idea generator of empirical research, (ii) by using philosophy as a frame of reference for interpreting ethnographic data and (iii) by using philosophy as an explanatory resource for discussing survey and register data.
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While medicine is solidly grounded on scientific areas such as biology and chemistry , some argue that it is in its essence not a science at all. With medicine playing a substantial societal role, addressing questions about the scientific... more
While medicine is solidly grounded on scientific areas such as biology and chemistry , some argue that it is in its essence not a science at all. With medicine playing a substantial societal role, addressing questions about the scientific nature of medicine is of obvious urgency. This paper takes on such a task and starts by consulting the literature on the "demarcation" problem in the philosophy of science. Learning from failures of earlier approaches, it proposes that we adopt a Deflated Approach, which acknowledges that "science" is a family resemblance concept that admits differences of degrees to nonscientific undertakings. Then, drawing on Paul Hoyningen-Huene's (Systematicity: The nature of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013); (Synthese 196: 907-928, 2019) account of systematicity and Alexander Bird's (Synthese 196: 863-879, 2019) analysis of examples from the history of medicine, the paper argues that medicine meets the requirement for systematicity on all dimensions and thereby qualifies as a science. The paper then considers and defuses two objections. First, it is shown that nonepistemic differences linked to the distinctive duality of medicine do not warrant thinking that medicine is not science. Second, against some recent criticism (Oreskes in Synthese 196: 881-905, 2019), the paper uses homeopathy as an example to show that (synchronic and diachronic) systematicity can succeed as a demarcation criterion.
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OPEN ACCESS (https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02140/full). In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of “meshed architecture” as found in performance studies... more
OPEN ACCESS (https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02140/full).
In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of “meshed architecture” as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We start with an account of various conceptions of situated cognition using the distinction between functional integration, which characterizes how an agent dynamically organizes to couple with its environment, and task dependency, which specifies various constraints and structures imposed by the environment (see Slors, 2019). We then exploit the concept of a meshed architecture as a model that provides a more focused analysis of situated cognition and performance. Through this analysis, we show how the model of meshed architecture can be enhanced through (1) the involvement of a more complex set of cognitive processes, (2) a form of intrinsic control, (3) the influence of affective factors, and (4) the role of factors external to the performer. The aim of this paper, then, is twofold: first to work out an enhanced conception of the model of meshed architecture by taking into consideration a number of factors that clarify its situated nature, and second, to use this model to provide a richer and more definitive understanding of the meaning of situated cognition. Thus, we argue that this reciprocal analysis gives us a very productive way to think about how various elements come together in skilled action and performance but also a detailed way to characterize situated cognition.
In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of “meshed architecture” as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We start with an account of various conceptions of situated cognition using the distinction between functional integration, which characterizes how an agent dynamically organizes to couple with its environment, and task dependency, which specifies various constraints and structures imposed by the environment (see Slors, 2019). We then exploit the concept of a meshed architecture as a model that provides a more focused analysis of situated cognition and performance. Through this analysis, we show how the model of meshed architecture can be enhanced through (1) the involvement of a more complex set of cognitive processes, (2) a form of intrinsic control, (3) the influence of affective factors, and (4) the role of factors external to the performer. The aim of this paper, then, is twofold: first to work out an enhanced conception of the model of meshed architecture by taking into consideration a number of factors that clarify its situated nature, and second, to use this model to provide a richer and more definitive understanding of the meaning of situated cognition. Thus, we argue that this reciprocal analysis gives us a very productive way to think about how various elements come together in skilled action and performance but also a detailed way to characterize situated cognition.
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In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of "meshed architecture" as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We start with an account of various conceptions of situated... more
In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of "meshed architecture" as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We start with an account of various conceptions of situated cognition using the distinction between functional integration, which characterizes how an agent dynamically organizes to couple with its environment, and task dependency, which specifies various constraints and structures imposed by the environment (see Slors, 2019). We then exploit the concept of a meshed architecture as a model that provides a more focused analysis of situated cognition and performance. Through this analysis, we show how the model of meshed architecture can be enhanced through (1) the involvement of a more complex set of cognitive processes, (2) a form of intrinsic control, (3) the influence of affective factors, and (4) the role of factors external to the performer. The aim of this paper, then, is twofold: first to work out an enhanced conception of the model of meshed architecture by taking into consideration a number of factors that clarify its situated nature, and second, to use this model to provide a richer and more definitive understanding of the meaning of situated cognition. Thus, we argue that this reciprocal analysis gives us a very productive way to think about how various elements come together in skilled action and performance but also a detailed way to characterize situated cognition.
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A large part of the contemporary literature on dehumanization is committed to three ideas: (a) dehumanization involves some degree of denial of humanness, (b) such denial is to be comprehended in mental terms, and (c) whatever exact... more
A large part of the contemporary literature on dehumanization is committed to three ideas: (a) dehumanization involves some degree of denial of humanness, (b) such denial is to be comprehended in mental terms, and (c) whatever exact mechanisms underlie the denial of humanness, they belong in the realm of post-perceptual processing. This chapter examines (c) and argues that the awareness of minds might belong to perceptual processing. This paves the way for the possibility that dehumanization might, at least in part, be a perceptual phenomenon, such that dehumanizers visually perceive the dehumanized as exhibiting lesser-than-human minds. It is perhaps unsurprising that the first systematic investigations of dehumanization approached the phenomenon as linked to contexts of war, genocide, extreme hatred, and violence. One guiding hypothesis was that dehumanizers exclude the dehumanized from a moral community of human beings, implicitly conceptualized as displaying distinct individualities and being embedded in caring interpersonal relations. By comprehending the dehumanized as deindividuated entities to which moral norms and considerations of fairness do not apply (Opotow 1990), dehumanizers are able to disengage from moral restrictions and self-sanctions (Bandura 1999).
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To provide an update on recent studies concerning social cognition in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), to compare different theoretical approaches used to interpret empirical data, and to highlight a number of conceptual issues. In... more
To provide an update on recent studies concerning social cognition in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), to compare different theoretical approaches used to interpret empirical data, and to highlight a number of conceptual issues. In regard to social cognition in ASDs, there is an emerging emphasis on early-onset and prolonged sensory-motor problems. Such sensory-motor problems may fit with the theories of social cognition that emphasize the importance of embodied interaction rather than deficits in mindreading, or they may reflect more general aspects of developmental disorders. Different theoretical frameworks offer alternative perspectives on the central characteristics in ASDs and motivate different ways of conceptualizing diagnosis and intervention. Theory-of-mind approaches continue to appeal to false-belief paradigms, and debate continues about the performance of individuals with autism. Likewise, there is continuing debate and renewed skepticism about the role of simulation a...
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Grief is often described as characterized by a particular emotional response to another person’s death. While this is true of paradigm cases, we argue that a broader notion of grief allows accommodating forms of this emotional experience... more
Grief is often described as characterized by a particular emotional response to another person’s death. While this is true of paradigm cases, we argue that a broader notion of grief allows accommodating forms of this emotional experience that deviate from the paradigmatic case. The bulk of the paper explores such a non-paradigmatic form of grief, anticipatory-vicarious grief (AV-grief), which is typically triggered by pondering the inevitability of our own death. We argue that AV-grief is a particular moral emotion that serves a unique function and is indissolubly linked to the practical identities of human agents. An agent’s AV-grief is about the harm that occurs to individuals whose practical identities depend on the agent.
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This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a " relaxed " (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two... more
This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a " relaxed " (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two accounts are examined, one by Rachel Cooper (2005; 2013) and one based on the work of Richard Boyd (1991; 1999; 2003; 2010). While these accounts do not directly pursue such a goal, the main aim is to probe whether deploying a " relaxed " notion of natural kind would be able to neutralize the criticism. While the conclusion is in the negative, the analysis raises doubts that it is possible to completely neutralize this criticism without assuming an overly simplistic view of the causal structure of the world.
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A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of... more
A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA). The paper starts by exploring the merits and limits of the main strategies that have been employed to defend PA. The second aim is to present and defend a version of PA, according to which some mental properties can be observational properties. Providing support for this thesis includes a shift of focus to properties presented in perceptual experience and a systematic examination of a body of recent empirical material on animacy perception and visual aftereffects.
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Christopher Boorse’s (Bio-Statistical Theory (BST) comprehends diseases in terms of departures from natural norms, which involve an objectively describable deviation from the proper physiological or psychological functioning of parts of... more
Christopher Boorse’s (Bio-Statistical Theory (BST) comprehends diseases in terms of departures from natural norms, which involve an objectively describable deviation from the proper physiological or psychological functioning of parts of the human organism. I argue that while recent revisions and additional considerations (Boorse 2014) shield the BST from a number of issues raised by critics, they give rise to significant new challenges. These are related to the attribution of epistemic authority, the possibility of multiple concepts in the authoritative literature, and the framing of BST as ‘‘philosophical explication.’’ The conclusion is that, in its current form, the BST is unable to provide a solid framework for a
naturalist classification.
naturalist classification.
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Drawing in part on the phenomenological tradition, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists subscribing to embodied accounts of cognition maintain that the acquisition and meaning of concepts is " grounded " in the human agent's... more
Drawing in part on the phenomenological tradition, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists subscribing to embodied accounts of cognition maintain that the acquisition and meaning of concepts is " grounded " in the human agent's sensorimotor capacities. After a brief introduction, the paper critically engages Lakoff and Johnson's work on conceptual metaphors in light of recent empirical findings. The paper underscores some limitations in Lakoff and Johnson's theoretical framework, points to philosophical problems that require further attention, and explores possible implications for understanding and treating mental disorders.
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Proponents of the ‘situationist’ view in philosophy [Doris 1998, 2002; Harman 1999, 2000, 2003; Merritt 2001; Merritt, Doris, and Harman 2010] draw on empirical findings demonstrating that individuals engaged in moral reasoning are... more
Proponents of the ‘situationist’ view in philosophy [Doris 1998, 2002; Harman 1999, 2000, 2003; Merritt 2001; Merritt, Doris, and Harman 2010] draw on empirical findings demonstrating that individuals engaged in moral reasoning are astonishingly susceptible to relatively minor and normatively irrelevant situational influences. Based on such evidence, situationists conclude that most people do not have efficacious ‘globalist’ moral character traits, and that moral behavior is influenced by specifics of the situation that are insensitive to reflectively endorsed moral norms [Merritt, Doris, and Harman 2010: 356]. Moreover, the traits might not be sufficiently ‘global’ to support the requirements of traditional virtue ethics.
Naturally, the situationist challenge provoked a number of responses from virtue ethicists. The ‘rarity response’ accepts the findings, but maintains that the fact that many people fail to display virtues is beside the point, as virtue ethicists acknowledge that virtues are rare [Badhwar 2009; Kupperman 2009; Miller 2014]. The ‘adjustment response’ also accepts the findings, but argues that they are compatible with virtue ethics, because a theory of virtue can be articulated in terms of empirically adequate ‘local’ traits [Hurka 2006; Miller 2008]. The ‘counterattack response,’ perhaps the most widespread response, denies that the empirical evidence supports the situationist claims [Kamtekar 2004; Sabini and Silver 2005; Sreenivasan 2002; 2013; Kristjansson 2008; Upton 2009].
In this paper, the main goal is to introduce and defend embodied situationism’ [ES], which is not susceptible to the ‘counterattack response’ and has implications for the ‘rarity’ and ‘adjustment’ responses.
The paper starts out with (1) a brief introduction to the main tenets of the ‘embodied cognition’ research agenda and a particular theoretical framework that explains cognition and abstract concepts as grounded in particular domains of bodily experience. This is followed by (2) a detailed examination of recent behavioral and neuroscientific research that appears to support this framework and account for a number of surprisingly substantial situational influences on moral reasoning. Subsequently, (3) it is argued that the empirical material and the theoretical framework support ES, and that ES is not susceptible to some of the criticism that has been launched against situationism. Finally, (4) the paper considers a number of additional objections particular to ES and (5) reflects on some of the implications of ES.
Naturally, the situationist challenge provoked a number of responses from virtue ethicists. The ‘rarity response’ accepts the findings, but maintains that the fact that many people fail to display virtues is beside the point, as virtue ethicists acknowledge that virtues are rare [Badhwar 2009; Kupperman 2009; Miller 2014]. The ‘adjustment response’ also accepts the findings, but argues that they are compatible with virtue ethics, because a theory of virtue can be articulated in terms of empirically adequate ‘local’ traits [Hurka 2006; Miller 2008]. The ‘counterattack response,’ perhaps the most widespread response, denies that the empirical evidence supports the situationist claims [Kamtekar 2004; Sabini and Silver 2005; Sreenivasan 2002; 2013; Kristjansson 2008; Upton 2009].
In this paper, the main goal is to introduce and defend embodied situationism’ [ES], which is not susceptible to the ‘counterattack response’ and has implications for the ‘rarity’ and ‘adjustment’ responses.
The paper starts out with (1) a brief introduction to the main tenets of the ‘embodied cognition’ research agenda and a particular theoretical framework that explains cognition and abstract concepts as grounded in particular domains of bodily experience. This is followed by (2) a detailed examination of recent behavioral and neuroscientific research that appears to support this framework and account for a number of surprisingly substantial situational influences on moral reasoning. Subsequently, (3) it is argued that the empirical material and the theoretical framework support ES, and that ES is not susceptible to some of the criticism that has been launched against situationism. Finally, (4) the paper considers a number of additional objections particular to ES and (5) reflects on some of the implications of ES.
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The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) has given rise to stimulating philosophical debates about the boundaries of the realm of the cognitive. This paper first investigates the usefulness of a " mark of the cognitive, " and then focuses on... more
The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) has given rise to stimulating philosophical debates about the boundaries of the realm of the cognitive. This paper first investigates the usefulness of a " mark of the cognitive, " and then focuses on two accounts that aim to provide such a mark, put forward by Fred Adams and Rebecca Garrison on one side and Mark Rowlands on the other. The paper provides a critical assessment of these accounts and uses empirical work on emotion regulation in infants to unearth some crucial challenges that any attempt at offering a mark of the cognitive should address.
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In spite of its importance as a life-defining rhythmic movement and its constant rhythmic contraction and relaxation of the body, respiration has not received attention in Embodied Cognition (EC) literature. Our paper aims to show that... more
In spite of its importance as a life-defining rhythmic movement and its constant rhythmic contraction and relaxation of the body, respiration has not received attention in Embodied Cognition (EC) literature. Our paper aims to show that (1) respiration exerts significant and unexpected influence on cognitive processes, and (2) it does so by modulating neural synchronization that underlies specific cognitive processes. Then, (3) we suggest that the particular example of respiration may function as a model for a general mechanism through which the body influences cognitive functioning. Finally, (4) we work out the implications for EC, draw a parallel to the role of gesture, and argue that respiration sometimes plays a double, pragmatic and epistemic, role, which reduces the cognitive load. In such cases, consistent with EC, the overall cognitive activity includes a loop-like interaction between neural and non-neural elements. 0. Introduction The emergence of cognitive science in the second half of the twentieth century offered a broad theoretical framework for understanding cognition. While its initial focus on abstract formal descriptions shifted to connectionist approaches based on neural models of cognitive architecture (Bermúdez, 2014; Haugeland, 1995; Thagard, 2013), standard cognitive science shares a fundamental "locational" commitment: whether mental processes are best seen as abstract formal processes (though exclusively realized in the brain), or as activation patterns in neural networks, they unfold in the brains of cognizers and can be adequately described in abstraction from the body (Clark, 2008; Rowlands, 2004; Shapiro, 2012). In contrast, the relatively recent research program "embodied cognition" (EC) opposes the "locational" commitment, holding that at least some cognitive processes are best comprehended in terms of a dynamic interaction of bodily (non-neural) and neural processes (Foglia & Wilson, 2013). EC is not a unified area of research, and the various research projects usually subsumed under the EC label lack homogeneity, established definitions (Wilson, 2002), and clarity about whether EC is conceived as complementing or providing an alternative to standard cognitive science. Central claims of EC are based on findings in several disciplines, including psychology, robotics, and neuroscience (see Barsalou, 2010). To mention a few instructive examples, researchers have demonstrated that sensorimotor variables can influence cognitive tasks (
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While the glorification of the “real” in Western societies is reaching new heights, the worry is that the quest for authenticity helps neutralize the struggle for social justice, ultimately broadening the range of instruments through... more
While the glorification of the “real” in Western societies is reaching new heights, the worry is that the quest for authenticity helps neutralize the struggle for social justice, ultimately broadening the range of instruments through which the market sphere expands beyond traditional constraints. The “be yourself” discourse may then regress into little more than a thinly veiled scheme of exploiting the hitherto untouched reservoirs of the self.
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A particular branch of the Embodied Cognition research program (EC) subscribes to the " scaffolding thesis " (ST) that explicates abstract concepts as grounded in particular domains of bodily experience. This chapter explores behavioral... more
A particular branch of the Embodied Cognition research program (EC) subscribes to the " scaffolding thesis " (ST) that explicates abstract concepts as grounded in particular domains of bodily experience. This chapter explores behavioral and neuroscientific research that appears to offer general support for ST. After considering some objections to ST, the chapter offers some reflections on a particular concern in the legal realm that such findings may give rise to.
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Worries about the potential medicalization of social and moral problems has propelled the debate on the nature of mental disorder, with normativists insisting that psychiatric classification is inherently value‐laden and naturalists... more
Worries about the potential medicalization of social and moral problems has propelled the debate on the nature of mental disorder, with normativists insisting that psychiatric classification is inherently value‐laden and naturalists maintaining that a purely descriptive account of disease is possible. In recent work, some authors take a different path, accepting that the concepts of disease and
mental disorder are value‐laden but maintaining that this does not prevent objective truths regarding mental disorder attribution. This paper explores two such accounts and the important steps they provide toward rethinking the nature and metaphysical status of mental disorder. The challenges raised in this paper are meant to contribute
to the further development of this stimulating work.
mental disorder are value‐laden but maintaining that this does not prevent objective truths regarding mental disorder attribution. This paper explores two such accounts and the important steps they provide toward rethinking the nature and metaphysical status of mental disorder. The challenges raised in this paper are meant to contribute
to the further development of this stimulating work.
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This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. 'Low-level theorists' argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties (textures, shapes,... more
This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. 'Low-level theorists' argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties (textures, shapes, colors), 'high-level theorists' argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while 'disunified view theorists' argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.
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Reading Marx’s work on central issues such as alienation and class struggle, one is often under the impression that the concept of dignity serves as a normative framework underpinning his diagnosis and criticism—especially in his early... more
Reading Marx’s work on central issues such as alienation and class struggle, one is often under the impression that the concept of dignity serves as a normative framework underpinning his diagnosis and criticism—especially in his early work. However, Marx also vehemently opposes concepts like “human dignity,” suggesting that moral terms like dignity are little more than “empty phrases.” To provide a better understanding of this tension, this reflection takes a closer look at the general understanding of morality within historical materialism, and the specific character of the Kantian notion of dignity that fuels Marx’s critical attitude.
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Editorial introduction to our volume
Dimensions of Practical Necessity (Palgrave, 2017.)
Dimensions of Practical Necessity (Palgrave, 2017.)
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Lay Summary : Evolutionary psychiatry has emerged to the status of an important theoretical perspective over the last two decades, and it has generated a sizeable volume of theoretical and empirical studies. It is understandable that many... more
Lay Summary : Evolutionary psychiatry has emerged to the status of an important theoretical perspective over the last two decades, and it has generated a sizeable volume of theoretical and empirical studies. It is understandable that many are attracted to the application of evolutionary principles to psychiatric phenomena. Some are attracted by the possibility of providing ultimate explanations for certain mental disorders, while others also think that such an approach can help to counterbalance a naïve understanding of mental disorder. As Nesse and Jackson [1: 194] put it, " campaigns to convince the public and practitioners that depression and anxiety are brain diseases have motivated much useful research and have decreased stigma, but they are biologically naive. An evolutionary approach supports a more medical model in which clinicians recognize many symptoms as defenses shaped by natural selection that are aroused by more primary causes, and others arising from defects in the systems that regulate defenses ". Nonetheless, while evolutionary psychiatry is assuming an increasing presence within psychiatric science, the " adaptive turn " has also generated a range of criticisms. Many researchers appreciate the contributions that evolutionary explanations offer for a number of mental disorders , but highlight serious problems that different versions of evolutionary explanations face. The investigation in this chapter was limited to addressing two evolutionary approaches to depression, the mismatch explanation and the persistence explanation. Although both accounts exhibit deficiencies, the conclusion that we should reject applications of evolutionary theory to depression is not warranted. Evolutionary psychiatry should be considered as a potential source of knowledge, and its heuristic value in the development of testable assumptions should not be ignored.
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In recent decades, the widespread acceptance of neoliberal ideas gave rise to forms of market-driven governance, which have, among other measures, increasingly given corporations responsibility for central government activities like... more
In recent decades, the widespread acceptance of neoliberal ideas gave rise to forms of market-driven governance, which have, among other measures, increasingly given corporations responsibility for central government activities like disaster management and recovery aid. In this paper, I provide an analysis of such developments in pre- and post- Hurricane Katrina New Orleans and argue that they can be described as instances of exploitation.
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While " dignity " plays an increasingly important role in contemporary moral and political debates, there is profound dispute over its definition, meaning, and normative function. Instead of concluding that dignity's elusiveness renders... more
While " dignity " plays an increasingly important role in contemporary moral and political debates, there is profound dispute over its definition, meaning, and normative function. Instead of concluding that dignity's elusiveness renders it useless, or that it signals its fundamental character, this paper focuses on illuminating one particular strand of meritocratic dignity. It introduces a number of examples and conceptual distinctions and argues that there is a specific strand of " expressive " meritocratic dignity that is not connected to holding a special office or rank, but that is ascribed to individuals who are able to engage in autonomous self-expression.
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The question of how we actually arrive at our knowledge of others’ mental lives is lively debated, and some philosophers defend the idea that mentality is sometimes accessible to perception. In this paper, a distinction is introduced... more
The question of how we actually arrive at our knowledge of others’ mental
lives is lively debated, and some philosophers defend the idea that mentality is
sometimes accessible to perception. In this paper, a distinction is introduced between
“mind awareness” and “mental state awareness,” and it is argued that the former at
least sometimes belongs to perceptual, rather than cognitive, processing.
lives is lively debated, and some philosophers defend the idea that mentality is
sometimes accessible to perception. In this paper, a distinction is introduced between
“mind awareness” and “mental state awareness,” and it is argued that the former at
least sometimes belongs to perceptual, rather than cognitive, processing.
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Hutto and Satne (Philosophia, 2015) review current attempts to provide a naturalized content and underline some of the most convincing reasons why they remain inadequate. The authors reframe and update Haugeland’s assessment of this... more
Hutto and Satne (Philosophia, 2015) review current attempts to provide a naturalized content and underline some of the most convincing reasons why they remain inadequate. The authors reframe and update Haugeland’s assessment of this research program, but besides describing the particular challenges facing the different candidate accounts, they also propose what seems to be a promising way to further a debate that has not advanced in recent years. In this paper I argue that a more detailed
exploration of some aspects of the neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist strategies might be helpful in order to advance the discussion.
exploration of some aspects of the neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist strategies might be helpful in order to advance the discussion.
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Some of our motives (desires, projects, etc.) that we act on are not only of unconstrained origin, but we also take them to express who we are and, thus, to “speak for us.” harry G. Frankfurt has maintained that it is the formation of a... more
Some of our motives (desires, projects, etc.) that we act on are not only of unconstrained origin, but we also take them to express who we are and, thus, to “speak for us.” harry G. Frankfurt has maintained that it is the formation of a hierarchical structure by means of an act of wholehearted identification that makes a given motive genuinely one’s own. I argue that wholehearted identifications fail to live up to this task. Instead, I demonstrate that only a subtype of wholehearted identifications,
namely core identifications, genuinely “speak for us.” In addition, I argue that core identifications help explain the peculiar phenomenology that characterizes some of our crucial choices.
namely core identifications, genuinely “speak for us.” In addition, I argue that core identifications help explain the peculiar phenomenology that characterizes some of our crucial choices.
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Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of... more
Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of behavioural effects across cognitive, affective, and perceptual domains. Additionally, respiratory-modulated brain oscillations have
been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover innovative pathways for understanding hidden links between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.
been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover innovative pathways for understanding hidden links between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.